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1
IN THE SUPRElVIE COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

l\1AX FAUSETT,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.

GENERAL

ELECTRIC

CONTRACTS

No. 6251

CORPORATION, a foreign corporation,
and W1ILLIAM HOLDAWAY,
Defendants and Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF AND RESPONDENT.

Max Fausett, the respondent, files this his Reply to
the Brief of the appellant, General Electric Contracts
Corporation.
MOTION TO DISl\tiiSS APPEAL.
Respondent has filed herein his Motion to Dismiss
this Appeal because it was taken before ~ny final j udgnlent was entered by the Trial Court. 'The Judgment Roll
reveals the entry of the followipg documents on the
respective dates: Judgment on the Verdict, entered January 24, 1940 ; plaintiff's Memorandum of Costs, filed January 24, 1940; appellants' Motion For New Trial, filed
January 26, 1940; Appellants' Motion to Retax Costs, filed
January 29, 1940; Judgment of Remittitur, entered February 19, 1940; Order Denying Motion For New Trial, entered February 19, 1940; Notice of Appeal and Bond, filed
~ebruary 21, 1940; Order Retaxing Costs entered April 25,
1940.
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There was no final or appealable judgment in this
case until April 25, 1940, at which time the court made its
order reducing plaintiff's costs by 1$18.40. ·The appeal taken
February 21, 1940, was therefore premature. The appellant
seems to agree with this conclusiqn and even goes further,
for on page 29 of its brief, it says:
"There is nothing in the record to show exactly
what the judgment now is in this matter.''
It is stated in 4 C.J.S., page 204, Section 108:
"'There is a diversity of authority as to whether
a final judgment must include a recovery for costs.
"In some states a j udgme;nt is not deemed
final for the purpose of an appeal, until the costs
:are taxed or awarded and inserted therein, unless
under statute or rule orf court the right to cosits has
been waived, and the judgment is complete and
final on its face. In other jurisdictions, however,
it is held under rtheir statutes that, although the
costs have pot been ascertained and stated, when
every other matter is disposed of, the judgment is
:final for the purpose of appeal.''
In Perkins vs. Sierra Nev. S. M. Co., 10 Nev. 411. the
Court quotes and approves the following:
"A judgn1ent or decree is. final that disposes
of the issues presented in the· case, determines the
costs, and leaves nothing for the future consideration of the court When no further action of the
eourt is required in order to determine the rights
of the parties in the action, it is final; when the
case is retained for further action it is inter·
locutory."
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See also,
Nevada First National Bank of Tonopah v.
Lamb, (Nev.) 271 Pac. 691;
Eisman vs. Eisman, (Nev.) 3 Pac. 2d, 107.1;
Richter vs. Lukaszewicz, (Wis.) 171 N. W., 671;
In St. Louis, I. M. & S. R. Co. vs. Southern
Express Co., 108 U. S. 24, 2 S. Ct. 6, 27 L. Ed., 639,

it is stated:
"The Supreme Court of the United States has
defiped a final judgment for the purpose of an appeal to be one that 'terminates 1the litigation between the parties on the merits of the case, and
leaves nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined'."
Until costs are inserted, an execution could not cover
them.
If a judgment leaves necessary further judicial ac-

tion, it is not final.
Freeman on Judgments, Vol. 1, 4th Edition,
page 18;
Shurtz vs. Thorley, 90 Utah 381, 61 Pac. 2d
1262;
Johnson vs. Solomons et al.~ (Cal.) 12 Pac. 2d
140;
Boxwell vs. Greeley Union National Bank,
(Colo.) 5 Pac. 2d 868 ;
Standard s~t:eam Laundry vs. Dole, 24 tJtah
469, 58 Pac. 1109.
In Oldroyd vs. McCrea, 65 Utah 142, 235 P. 580 at
588, the court says a judgment is not final until it states:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"What the prevailing parties shall receive and
what the losing party is required to do, pay or
discharge, and in that way adjudicates and disposes the matters in controversy."
When the appellant contested the respondent's costs.
it put that matter in controversy and until it was settled
it could -not be determined how much the appellant was
required to pay t'he respondent.
Robison vs. Salt Lake City, 37 lTtah 520, 109
.Pac. 816;
Cantwell vs. M·cPherson, (Idaho) 29 Pac. 102.
In this last case cited, the defendant recovered a
judgment of non-suit and for his costs .. He did not file a
Cost Bill within the statutory thne. On appeal the defe.nda!llt contended that the judgment was not' final because
costs \:vere not inserted. The court agreed with the defendant on ~that proposition of law, but held that the defendant
waived his right, to file a Cost Bill and therefore the judgment became final. The Idaho Statute cited by the court
in support of its ruling is substantially the same ·as Section 104-44-14 of the 1933 R. S. U.
In the case of Richardson vs. Rogers, (Minn.) 35 N.
W. 2~0, the court held:
"The costs properly constitute a part of the
judgment, and unless they are waived or releas·ed
by the prevailing party, he is as much entitled to
have them included as other relief. For the purposes of an appeal ~the cases in New York and in
Wisconsin hold under substantially similar statutory provisions, that a judgment is not perfected
until the costs are inserted and hence 1the time of
appeal ·does not run against the defeated party
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until they are properly taxed and included in the
judgn1ent. 2 N. \V. 98, 32 N. W\. 42, 5 How. Pr. 360,
45 Barb. 352, 42 Barb. 444."
In the case of Luke vs. Avera, (Ga.) 85 S. E. 121,
the plaintiff sued the defendant Sheriff because he refused to sell certain goods under execution. After hearing,
the court ordered the Sheriff to sell the goods and said:
"Let the question of costs remain open for further order. Judgment and order signed in open
court, this March 23, 1914."
The appeal was dismissed because the judgment was
interlocutory.
THE COURT ERRED IN RETAXING COSTS
HEREIN (Abs. 85).
On the opening day of Court, to-wit, January 16,
1940, Sylvia Fausett, Margaret Woolsey, Rose Fausett,
Elva Fausett and Elvan Woolsey were duly and regularly
sworn as witnes·ses for the plaintiff (Tr. 11). These witnesses, except Elvan Woolsey were in attey1dance at all
sessions of the court, to-wit, four days, and Elvan Wool..
sey attended but the first session of the court, (See J udgment Roll page 133). The defendants moved to limit the
fees to two days' attendance, to-wit J~uary 16th and
January 17th, for the first five above named, and alleged
that Elvan Woolsey was entitled to no fee because he did
not testify. Elvan Woolsey was sick and unable to attend
court on the 17th and respondent's attorney wanted defendant's a~ttorneys to stipulate as to what he would
testify to if he were present (Tr. 134) but attorneys
could not agree on his testimony. It was then discovered
that 'his brother, Myron Woolsey, was present in court
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and could testify to the same facts that Elvan Woolsey
would have testified to.
The def~dants took two days to put on their testimony after vvhich respondent and plaintiff put on rebuttal
testimony. Respondent had no vvay of calculating how
much time defendants would need for their testimony and
it was necessary for him to have his witnesses present in
court to give rebuttal testimony, if necessary, as soon as
defendants had concluded. Elvan Woolsey, after being
sworn, was entitled to one day's fee and mileage even ·though
he became sick thereafter and could not testify. The other
witnesses were entitled to four days' fees.
See,
Crawford v.s. Abraham, 2 Oregon 163 ;
Cole vs. Ducheneau, 13 Utah 42, 44 Pac. 92;
Smith vs. Nelson, 23 Utah 512, 65 Pac. 485.
Appellant General .Electric Contracts : Corporation
grounds it appeal on three propositions set out on pages·
10 and 11 of its Brief. The first is "1.1here is no unlawful
repossession of the refrigerator by William Holdaway"
for the reaso n "that at no time was the contract ·current."
Respondent denies t'he premise and the alleged proof
thereof.
1

PLAINTIFF WAS NOT IN DEFAULT AT J)ATE OF
REPOSSESSION OF REFRIGERATOR.
lVIrs. Max Fausett made most of the payments (Tr.
52). She made some :to General Electric Contracts Corporation direct (Tr. 16) and some to William Holdaway (Tr.
258). The first monthly payment of $10.00 was due
August 28, 1938. From that date to May 28, 1939, the
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date of the repossession, there matured ten payments or
a total of $100.00. ~Ir. Lyon, for appellant, said he had
received $75.00 during that peTiod (Tr. 216) but the evidence s~ows the Fausetts were not given credit for $40.00
paid during that time as follows: $10.00 paid by Mrs.
Fau:::ett during ··"·inte1· n1onths" of 1938-1939. She paid
this to \Villiam Holdaway on the refrige-rator account (Tr.
84). He, however, V\rithout authority from her, applied it
to her priYdte accou.nt to him (Tr. 85). Holdaway never
denied that she paid him this $10.00 on the refrigerator
account. She ordered it paid on that account. The General
Electric Contracts Corporation ra;tified payments by her
to Holdaway (Tr. 236) so, that payment of $10.00 must
be acknovvledged; $15.00 vvas paid by Max Fausett to
'Villiam Holdavvay on the refrigerator account March 14,
1939 (Tr. 53). ~~t the san1e time he said he paid $10.00
on his private account vvith Holdaway. Holdavvay never
denied .receiving this ~~15.00 and he introduced Exhibit
Thirteen, which is a credit to Fausett of $10.00 on his
private account on 1.\farch 14, 1939. Mr. Lyon said he
never received that $15.00 from William Holdaway (Tr.
237), so that payment of $15.00 must be acknovvledged.
$15.00 was paid in currency the "fore part of Mlay," 1939
to Holdaw·ay (Tr. 86). This payment is corroborated by
mother of Mrs. Max Fauset~t (Tr. 115). Holdaway failed
to send this sum to General Electric Contracts Corporation and it was never credited (Tr. 237).
The Fauset,ts were between two cross-fires and it is
immaterial that they did not know how much was due on
the contract. It was the duty of the General Electric Contracts Corporation and William Holdaway to treat them
fairly and credit them with payments made on the reefrig:..
erator account made to both of them. $40.00 added to the
$75.00 makes $115.00 they had paid up to "fore part of
May," 1939. That sum took care of all payments up to and
including the May, 1939 payment and left $5.00 over paid
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when the refrigerator' was unlawfully repossessed on May
28, 1939.

'

EXTENSION OF TIME
The responde:nt was not in default for the further
reason that extensions of time in which to make payments
were granted him from time to time. Exhibit A, the contract, recites that time is the essence, but it also states
that,
"If payments are not made vvithin · fifteen days
after due date,~'
buyer must pay a late charge. Fifteen days' grace are thus
specifically give n, together with an undertermined further time upon payment of late charge. The various letters
that comprise Exhibit 8 show "late charges" made and
show· various extensions of time. Where extensions of
time are· granted to pay ins·tallments, the buyer is entitled to reasonable notice that such extensions
are dis,
continued.
1

1Columbia Airways vs. Stevens, 80 u~tah 215,
14 Pac. 2d 984.
Bearslee vs. North Paint Finance Corp., (Wash.)
29·6 Pac. 155.
The acceptance of $15.00 on "fore part of May," 1939
by defendant Holdaway for defendapt General Electric
Contracts Corpor~tion, waived all past defaults, by
Fausetts, if any there were.

tttr

Hoppin vs Munsey (Cal.) ~ Pac. 398, 400.
Newe1l vs. E. B. & A. L. Stone Co. (Cal.) 184
Pac. 659.
Noyes vs. Schlegel (Cal.) 99 Pac. 726.
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Peck vs. Coyle (Cal.) 125 Pac. 1073.
Drier vs. Sherwood (Colo.) 238 Pac. 38.
Bell vs. Stadler (Idaho) 174 Pac. 129.
Suburban Homes Co. vs. North (Mont.) 145
Pac. 2
Gray vs. Pelton (Ore.) 135 Pac. 755.
·Cornely vs. Campbell (Ore.) 186 Pac. 563.
Kohler vs. Lundberg 4 Utah 339, 180 Pac. 590.
Gosling vs. Jones, 70 Utah 49, 257 Pac. 1058.
Cameron vs. Purbaugh (Wash.) 227 Pac. 858.
THE DEFENDANT WILLIAM HOLD.AWA Y WAS AN
AGE'NT OF DEFEN:DANT GENERAL ELE:CTRIC CONTRACTS CORPORATION
The appellant's seeond ground for appeal: There is
no evidence that \Villiam Holdaway was acting as agent
for General Electric Contra_cts Corporation in repossessing
the refrigerator, is not foupded in the evidence, in fact the
opposite is true. Plaintiff's Exhibi't G is a blank copy of a
trust receipt or an agreement between Carbon Furniture
& Appliance Company, succeeded to by defendant and appellant William Holdaway, which is called the floor plap
in the evidence (Tr. 149 and Tr. 165) and was in use by
the appellant in the year 1938 (Tr. 175). Part of Exhibit
G. reads:
"The undersigned before the termination of
this Trust may sell said property for account of
General Electric Contracts Corporation, to a bona
fide purchaser at r~tail for cash, for not less than
the sum indicated in column 5 on the reverse side
hereof as to each product covered hereby, and immediately after such sale, the undersigned shall
deliver the proceeds thereof to General Electric
Contracts Corporation, and until such delivery shall
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hold such pl}oceeds in trus't for General Electric
'Contracts Corporation separate from the funds of
the undersigned."
"The undersigned" on this document, of course, is
Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company. Pu:r~suant to the
authority in Exhibit G the General Electric Contracts
Corporation furnished Carbon Furniture & Appliance
Company with Conditional Sale Contracts in blank, and on
July 7, 1938 the Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company
sold respondent the refrige·rator and drew the contract
on one of those blanks (Exhibit A) on which appea~s these
words in addition to the contract:
"Original for General Electric Contracts Corporation."
At the end of the co,ntract, these words also appeared:
"Buyers credit statement must be filled out
and dealer must execute assignment."
'These are words of a command from a pri:ncipal to
his agent or master to his servant.
Part of Exhibit B is :
"All warranties, terms and provisions of an
agreement between the undersigned · and General
Electric Contracts Corporation are made a part hereof by reference; and upon which Geperal Electric
Contracts Corporation relies upon making this
purchase."
By the provisions of the floor plan, the dealer (Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company) paid 10% on ,the
refrigerator in question to Graybar Electric Company.
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.A.fter the dealer signed the trust receipt, Exhibit G, the
Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company was under no
further obligation to Graybar Electric Company. General
Electric Contracts Corporation then paid Graybar the
balance on the refrigerator and thereafter the Carbon
Furniture and Appliance Company disposed of the refrigerator "for an account of General Electric Co_;ntracts Corporation" and was obliged ''to deliver the proceeds thereof"
to General Electric Contracts Corporation (Tr. 151-152).
This is a principal and agent set-up.
The "warranty, terms and provisions of an agreement," mentioned in Exihibt B, referred to defendants'
Exhibit 1 which is Application And Agreement of Carbon
Second Hand Store of Price, U~tah, which is none other
than Carbon Furniture & Appliance Company, succeeded
to by the defendant William Holdaway. Part of this agree·ment recites:
"You sha:ll have the sole right to make collections on all Accounts and we agree not to solicit
or make any co11ections or repossession in respect
to any Accounts sold to you, nor to accept the return of nor make any substitution of any Equipment covered thereby except pursuapt to your instructions, and to forward to you promptly all
communications, inquiries or remittances, which
we may receive in reference to said Accounts."
Pursuant to those provisions the defendant William
Holdaway could not solicit or make collections from Max
Fausett or repossess the refrigerator "except pursuant" to
instructions f~om the appellant General Electric Contracts
Corporation. Pursuant to Exhibit G and Exhibit B and
Exhibit One, General Electric Contracts Corporation became the owner of the Fausett contract. Pursuant to Ex-
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hibit One General Electric ·Contracts Corporation advised
William Holdaway as follows:
Exhibit 8, letter of November 9, 1938> appell¥t
General Electric Contracts Corporation requested defendant William Holdaway to,
"contact the customer at once to see that the
customer makes his pay1nents.''
Exhibit 8, letter of November 22, 1938:
" . . . . . advise what arrangements you have
m·ade with the customer if you have not collected
the September and October 29 instalm~nts."
Exhibit 8, letter of March 23, 1939:
"Dear Bill :
"It will be possible for you to take the refrigerlator without having to take replevin action. If you
once get hold of it, don't give it back to him until
he pays ·the entire balance of $81.64, plus $2.50 late
charges. Will you please advise me what results you
have on this account.
H. P. Gough."
Exhibit 8, letter of May 11, 1939:
"Dear Bill :
"If you have not already done so, suggest you
replevin the merchandise."
Exhibit 10, page 2,
"Customer refuses to pay as agreed. You are re~ossessing."
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These are all "rords of con1mand from a principal to
his age~t or a master to his servant, and it· makes no
difference \\7hich. The facts are: Notwithstanding, Holdaway had collected . from Fausett $15.00 currency a short
time be:fore receiving this order to repossess and had failed to send it to the General Electric. Contracts Corporation, he waited until the Fausetts were all away from
home and then took the refrigerator upon demand of appellant General Electric Contracts Corporation.
Under Exhibit G a·nd Exhibit One, the General Electric Contracts Corpora;tion controlled the acts of William
_Holda\vay in connection with the Fausett contract.
"If such a right or control belongs to the
principal or master the per~on doing the work is
not an independent contractor, but is an agent or
servant. It is to be noted in this connection that it
is not actual interference in the work that denotes
the agency, it is the right to interfere that makes
the clifference between an independent contract and
a servant or agent.'' Chatalain vs. Thackery,
----Utah
, 100 Pac. 2d at 199.
Appellanrt not only had the right to interfere in the
Fausett contract because it required Holdaway to sign an
agreement, Exhibit One, which .recites:
"You (General Eelctric Contracts Corpora-tion) shall have the sole right to make collections
on all Accounts and we agree not to solic.it or make
allY collections or repossessions ~n respect to any
A~counts sold to you, nor to accept the return or
not make any substitution of any Equipment covered thereby except pursuant to your instructio:ns,
and to forward to you promptly all communications,
inquiries or rem·ittances, which we may receive
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in reference to said Accounts,"
but it actually did interfere· in Jhe collection ¥d repossession of the Fausett refrigerator. It ordered Holdaway to make contacts with and collect from Fausetts.
Pursuant to such order he made some collections he never
sent in. It ordered him to repossess (Exhibit Ten) and
acting upon that order, he did repossess the refrigerator
(Tr. 83). ~xhibtt One gives appellant the right to demand
that l-Ioldaway repossess as well as repurchase the contract. By that agreen1ent General Electric Contracts
Corporation protected itself not only with the financia~
ability of Holdaway, but it further protected itself with
the right of "repossession" of the property. The plaiintiff
has fully and completely es,tablished the agency of Holdaway to appell~nt. Exhibits A, B. One and Ten all show
that only the person who owned the title to the refrigerator, held ~the power and authority to repossess it. As
late as June 28, 1939, at least thirty days after the
unlawful repossessiop, the appellant General Electric
Contracts Corporation still owned the legal title to the
refrigerator and had in its possession Exhibit A, the Contract of Sale. Exhibit H is ap assignment in blank dated
June 28, 1939, signed by J. H. Strube. It is found on
rthe same sheet as Exhibit B. It was in existance when the
contract was returned from appellant's New York office
to its Salt Lake City office (Tr. 300). June 19, 1939, the
Contract of Sale was in the New York office (Tr. 89) and
it remained there until June 28, 1939, as aforesaid. Only
the appellant General Electric ·Contracts Corporation
could legally order a repossession and it did so order it on
May 12, 193!) (Exhibit Ten), and its agent, William Holdaway, u:nder that order, unlawfully repossessed respondent's refrigerator on that date. We subm'it there was
sufficient evidence for the Jury to find and William Holdaway was the agent of the General Elec.tric Contracts
Corporation in repossessing the refrigerator, and the ap-
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pellant.s' second g·round for appeal must fail.
INSTRU·CTIONS OF THE COURT
The appellant's Third Ground for Appeal is based on
alleged errors in the Court's instructions as to damages.
The Court instructed the Jury generally on the subject of damages correctly. If appellant had desired any
specific instn1ctions on damages, it was its duty to make
such request. It did not do so, so it cannot now complain.
See,

Griffins vs. Clift, 4 Utah 462, 11 Pac. 609.
Thackery vs. Union Portland Cement Co., 64
Utah 437, 231 Pac. 813.
Re Hans~1's vVill, 50 Utah 207, 167 Pac. 256.
Everts vs. 'Vorrell, 58 Utah 238: 197 Pac. 1043.
Even if the court erred in not instructing the Jury
that they must deduct the amount unpaid on the contract from the value of the refrigerator, such error was
harmless because plaintiff eliminated from the judgment
the amount G~eral Electric Contracts Corporation claimed still due, to-wit, $66.64 (Judgment Roll page 141).
Such remittitur was allowed by the court (Judgment Roll
page 145). If the court were in error by failing to specifically instruct as to damages, a new trial should not be
granted on that point because ~the said remittitur has accomplished what a new trial would do on that objection.

The repossession was unlawful, as pointed out above.
On the 19th day of June, 1939, the appellant' still had the
contract of sale (it was then in its New York office for
safe keeping. Tr. 184). Respondent was not in default, as
pointed out above. On that date, respond~nt tendered ap-
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pellant payment of $66.75, which ~was a few cents more
than the amount claimed by appellant (Exhibit D). Appellant's agent William Holdaway, told Elva Fausett,
mother of respondent and plaintiff Max Fausett, a day
after repossession, that the refrigerator was ;taken "to
protect it," because respondent's house . was vacant and
that Holdavvay had told the company i1t was vacant (Tr.
129). This agent further told her that she could have the
refrigerator back by paying the full balance of $66.64
(Tr. 1:29). Pursuant to 'that promise, Mrs. Max Fausett,
wife of respondent, tendered the appellant payment, as
aforesaid. The check was refused, not because it was not
a currency payment, but ·because the agent said ·Holdaway elaimed the Fausetts still owed him on a private
account (Tr. 90). In the first part of June, 1939 (Tr. 135)
!foldaway would have given the refrigerator back to the
Fausetts if they had paid him the balance of the private
account against them (Tr. 137). The remittitur was not
made because respondent owed the $66.64, because the
evidence shows he only owed $26.64 to finish paying the
contract out, but it was made becuase appellant claimed
there VV"as $66.64 still due. Respond~nt gave up the $40.00
differ~ce so as to evade any possibility of a New Trial on
the Court's failure to instruct that the balance due on the
refrigerator should be deducted from the present value
thereof.
Appellant, in its Brief, points out alleged discrepancy
betvv-een witnesses concerning the depreciation of the refrigerator. The Jury , exercised its rights to believe one
wi,tness against another and the appellant cannot disturb
its verdict on that point \vhere there is some evidence to
support the verdict.
This case reveals a situation ~here the parties were
not dealing at arm's length, but it is a situation where a
powerful corporation dictates all the terms of the contract,
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everyone of vvhich is to its advantage. It then trus,ts the
collection of it to an agent who has a private account
against the buyer. The buyer is careless with his receipts
and he does not know at any tim.e just how much he owes
on the contract. The agent misapplied at least $10.00 paid
to him on the contract, and credited it to his private account against the buyer. He, the agent, failed to account
entirely for $30.00 more paid to him on the contract. The
corporation becomes impatient and orders repossession,
not knowing the account is not in default. The corporation
is not to be punished because it is powerful and technical
in its contracts, nor because it demands what is due it on
the due date ; but everything it did and everything , its
agents said and did tha,t benefit these unsophisticated
buyers should be strictly construed agaipst the corporation
and ¥1 !he favor of the buyer. They were not on equal
terms with 'the corporation. They were completely 'vitliin
its power and this court should see to it that that power
was not abused.
The Appeal should be disinis.sed and the Judgment
allowed to stand with the addition of $18.40 to plaintiff'~

costs, which sum was deducted by the court from the
Plaintiff's Cost Bill, without authority of law.
Respectfully submitted.
F. B. HAMMOND,
Respondent's Attor~ey
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